Lock the server down before the editor goes public (#427)

The editor is about to be opened to strangers: a post on Reddit and a
guest access (#428). nginx served the whole workspace and ran every PHP
file in it, the API let anybody guess passwords as fast as they liked,
and one account could fill the disk.

- nginx (shared web stack, outside this repo, backup in
  /root/config-backup-20261015/) hands out only the two pages, dist/,
  public/brand/, the uploads by kind and ending, and api/index.php.
  Everything else under /feuerwerk/ is a 404.
- PHP behind it has display_errors off and no X-Powered-By. Plain HTTP
  forwards to HTTPS, the API refuses it.
- Headers: a Content-Security-Policy without inline code or eval,
  nosniff, frame-ancestors, HSTS, Referrer-, Permissions-, COOP, CORP.
- vite.config.ts writes the same policy into the built pages, so CI
  runs the whole suite under it. Pixi gets by without eval through
  pixi.js/unsafe-eval. The page CSS left its inline style for a file.
- The harness fails a module for anything the policy refuses, from
  Chrome's log and from the page's securitypolicyviolation event.
- LoginThrottle: five wrong passwords from one address within 15
  minutes, and it gets 429 until 15 minutes after the last of them.
  The address is the last X-Forwarded-For entry, the Brandmauer's own.
- Quota: 1 GB per account for uploads, projects and snapshots. Only a
  write that grows the account is refused (413). Admins have no limit.
- A write whose Sec-Fetch-Site says another site is refused (403).
- The session cookie carries Secure, nginx passes HTTPS on.
- showFailure puts the message in as text, not as HTML.
- Every PHP script outside api/ stops unless it runs on the command
  line.
- The video worker sees the checkout read-only and can only write
  data/videos. No capabilities, 2 GB and 256 processes at most.
- tests/php/rights.test.php runs the API under php -S on a scratch
  directory and asks every route as signed out, owner, stranger and
  admin. A route named in api/index.php but missing in the matrix
  fails it. limits.test.php covers the brake and the quota.

Findings:

- tmp/ was readable from outside, with 79 copies of project files.
  Closed on 15.10. at 20:02 with chmod 750. The log back to 11.10.
  shows only our own requests.
- Port 8080 is bound on 0.0.0.0, so the LAN could reach nginx past the
  Brandmauer. Left as it is: the web stack is not this project's.
- npm audit finds nothing in what is shipped. Dev tools (vitest,
  brace-expansion, source-map-js) have advisories, not touched here.

Tests: check 313 files / 4843 tests. PHP limits 21, rights 60,
accounts 56, snapshots 15, releases 20, files 46 (videos 50/51, no
ffmpeg in the web container). e2e on stein2, atx was off: 34+38+41
197/198, the one red check (a click in 41) passes with 41 alone,
27/27. 67 misses frames at 1080p on stein2 with and without this.
Path list from outside: 10 served, 26 refused. ZAP baseline against
the live site: nothing High or Medium under /feuerwerk/.
Counter-checks: rights.test.php without the cross-site guard, the
quota, the brake, the admin check of users, or with an undocumented
route fails each time. A policy without wasm-unsafe-eval fails e2e 41
with the harness's own CSP line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

tools/lib/harness.mjs

@@ -563,6 +563,7 @@ export async function runChecks(options, body) {
   console.log(`browser: ${where}`);
 
   const consoleLog = [];
+  const refused = [];
   let failures = 0;
   let checkCount = 0;
   function check(name, ok, detail = '') {
@@ -625,14 +626,26 @@ export async function runChecks(options, body) {
       mobile: false,
     });
     await requireGpu(cdp);
+    // The built pages carry a Content-Security-Policy (#427), and what it refuses may break nothing a
+    // check looks at. Chrome says so in its log for most refusals, in the page's own event for some
+    // (WebAssembly), and the event of a worker only in the log.
+    await cdp.send('Log.enable');
+    await cdp.send('Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument', {
+      source: `addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', (e) => console.warn('[csp] ' + e.violatedDirective + ' refused ' + (e.blockedURI || 'inline')), true);`,
+    });
     cdp.on((msg) => {
-      if (msg.method === 'Runtime.consoleAPICalled')
-        consoleLog.push(msg.params.args.map((a) => a.value ?? a.description).join(' '));
+      if (msg.method === 'Runtime.consoleAPICalled') {
+        const text = msg.params.args.map((a) => a.value ?? a.description).join(' ');
+        consoleLog.push(text);
+        if (text.startsWith('[csp] ')) refused.push(text);
+      }
       if (msg.method === 'Runtime.exceptionThrown')
         consoleLog.push(
           'EXCEPTION ' +
             (msg.params.exceptionDetails.exception?.description ?? msg.params.exceptionDetails.text),
         );
+      if (msg.method === 'Log.entryAdded' && /Content Security Policy/i.test(msg.params.entry.text))
+        refused.push(msg.params.entry.text);
     });
     await body(makeTools({ cdp, projectId, baseUrl, consoleLog, check, shotPrefix }));
     ws.close();
@@ -652,6 +665,10 @@ export async function runChecks(options, body) {
       stopBrowser();
     });
   }
+  // Reported only when it happens, so a passing run keeps its count of checks; and also after a step
+  // that threw, which a refusal is the likeliest cause of.
+  if (refused.length)
+    check('the pages stay within their Content-Security-Policy', false, [...new Set(refused)].slice(0, 3));
   if (consoleLog.length) console.log('--- console ---\n' + consoleLog.slice(0, 20).join('\n'));
   reportedSummary = true;
   console.log(failures ? `${failures} FAILED` : `ALL PASSED – ${checkCount} checks`);